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3.13.2 — Security by Design

Employ architectural designs, software development techniques, and systems engineering principles that promote effective information security within organizational systems.

Security must be a deliberate design decision, not something added after the architecture is built. The principle is defense in depth — multiple overlapping layers so that if any single control fails, others compensate.

Five layers of defense in a well-designed CUI environment:

  1. Network — segmentation, firewalls, boundary controls
  2. Identity — MFA, least privilege, conditional access
  3. Endpoint — hardened configs, EDR, encryption
  4. Data — DLP, sensitivity labels, encryption at rest
  5. Monitoring — SIEM, alerts, incident response

The assessor isn’t looking for perfect security. They’re looking for evidence that you thought about security architecture and made deliberate decisions — not that things grew organically with security patched in later.

Document your architecture decisions and the rationale behind them.


Your assessor needs a “yes” to every row:

#QuestionWhat “yes” looks like
1Are security design principles applied in the system architecture?Architecture documentation shows deliberate security design decisions
2Is defense in depth implemented?Multiple overlapping layers of controls — not a single point of failure
3Are systems engineering principles applied?Security considered at design time, not retrofitted

Documents they’ll review: System and communications protection policy; system security plan; system design documentation; security architecture documentation; system configuration settings

People they’ll talk to: System or network administrators; personnel with information security responsibilities; system developers; enterprise architects

Live demos they’ll ask for: Mechanisms implementing security design principles in the system architecture


These are the actual questions. Have answers ready.

  • “Walk me through your security architecture. What layers of defense do you have?”
  • “If your firewall fails, what other controls protect CUI?”
  • “Was security designed into the architecture or added later?”
  • “Show me your architecture documentation — where are the security decisions documented?”
  • “How do you evaluate security when making architectural changes?”

No architecture documentation. Systems grew organically with no deliberate design. Document your current architecture and the security rationale.

Single point of failure. All security depends on one firewall or one control. If it fails, CUI is exposed.

Security retrofitted. Systems built first, security added later — creating gaps where security doesn’t fit naturally.

No compensating controls. Each control stands alone. If one fails, there’s no backup.



RequirementWhy it matters here
3.13.1 — Guard the BoundariesBoundary protection is one layer of the defense-in-depth architecture
3.13.5 — DMZ for Public SystemsDMZ separation is an architectural decision
3.4.2 — Harden EverythingHardened configs are the endpoint layer of defense in depth

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Step-by-step guides for Microsoft 365, AWS, Azure, and GCP are available to Ancitus clients.

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CMMC Practice ID: SC.L2-3.13.2 | SPRS Weight: 5 points | POA&M Eligible: No